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Before their installation, critical systems must be assessed by an independent authority, who ensures that
software components are really compliant with a set of requirements described in standards. Such standards
describe the framework and the rules to be strictly followed along the development process. Moreover high
levels of safety highly recommand the use of formal methods.
In this paper, we examine how the FoCaL development environment can help to fulﬁl these requirements
and to ease assessment. This tool aims to help all stages of critical software development, at least when
formal methods are required (step-by-step speciﬁcation and implementation, properties expressed by ﬁrst-
order formulae, proofs helped by automatic tool). Upon our experience as either software safety assessor or
researchers in software engineering and formal methods, we propose a development life cycle adapted to the
FoCaL speciﬁcity and compliant with independent assessment requirements, through a complete example.
We show how features such as inheritance, late binding, redeﬁnition, parametrisation, encapsulation and
declarations/deﬁnitions, properties/theorems, whole development checked by an independent proof assistant
and partially automatic documentation can be used to improve the global safety and the re-use of software
components.
Keywords: formal methods, assessment, software life-cycle, FoCaL
1 Introduction
Software development process is usually presented as the cooperation between two
major actors: the end user, whose describes the “what” and the software devel-
1 This work is supported in part by the Agence Nationale de la Recherche under grant ANR-06-SETI-016
for the SSURF Project (Safety and Security UndeR Focal).
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oper which answers the “how”. The development of safety critical software needs
to integrate a third participant, the governmental regulatory bodies (authorities).
Their main task is to assert the compliance of each stage of the development with
national and/or international Standards before commissioning. Most of them, such
as the future DO-178C 2 [2] for avionics or Cenelec EN 50128 [1] for railway sys-
tems, are dedicated to a speciﬁc domain whereas some others, such as IEC-61508
[4] or Common Criteria for security [3], have a much more generic purpose. These
standards, usually built upon a classical view of development cycle of products,
provide requirements about activities to be performed, contents of outputs to be
produced, veriﬁcations to carry out along each phase of this cycle and describe some
mandatory support activities such as Change and Conﬁguration Management.
For non vital software, Veriﬁcation and Validation (V&V) is a rather informal
process usually performed by the software engineer himself. But Critical systems
cannot escape a full assessment process by a third-party expert. Indeed, standards
prescribe the organisational independence level between the diﬀerent teams involved
in the development. The assessor has to evaluate the full development process from
the system level to the embedded software. Note that, being legally liable in case of
damages caused by the system, the assessor will refuse commissioning of the system
under evaluation, if he/she has any doubt regarding the safety/security/reliability
demonstration. For these reasons, developers of critical systems have the greatest
interest in easing the assessment process of their products and particularly the
veriﬁcation of the life-cycle compliance with the prescriptions of the standards.
When high criticality or insurance levels must be reached, standards require
the use of formal methods during the software development cycle. These methods
usually oﬀer a non-ambiguous language and some features to express and to reason
upon properties. They can be proof or veriﬁcation-based, but they can be use-
fully applied only if the system concepts, its purposes and its potential hazards are
described clearly, precisely and as completely as possible.
The ﬁrst author has 15-years experience in assessment of critical systems, ei-
ther developed via formal or conventional methods, and is a “third party” expert
in railway systems. The two next authors work on the theory, design and imple-
mentation of the FoCaL environment 3 (presented within this paper), which aims to
ease development of safety critical software through a proof-based formal approach.
The contents of the paper are issued from the assessment experience and some ex-
periments using FoCaL features to answer needs of development and assessment of
software parts of critical systems. We mainly focus in this paper on the software
life-cycle.
As is commonly known, a software life-cycle is a sequence of steps describing how
a development team speciﬁes, designs, implements, tests, and maintains a piece of
software. Each stage is described by its required inputs, performed activities and
expected outputs, together with documentation, required properties, etc. There are
2 DO-178B introduces formal methods in a ”soft” tone, but DO-178C is discussing it more directly.
3 homepage : http://focal.inria.fr
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diﬀerent presentations of software cycles (V-cycle, Waterfall, . . . ). Unfortunately,
rather often in practise some phases, such as speciﬁcation or maintenance, are not
fully accomplished.
In the case of critical embedded software, the cycle is usually a V-cycle, mainly
decomposed into ﬁve (mandatory) phases: requirements speciﬁcation, architecture
design, implementation and low level testing, integration/validation testing and the
longest one, the maintenance phase. Moreover, standards ask for strict bound-
aries between phases together with traceability between phases, and the assessment
process must state that these demands are fully achieved. Each software require-
ment must be linked to software components implementing it and to the set of
tests validating this requirement. Similarly, each line of code should be linked to a
need (software requirements or architecture design choices). Indeed many anomalies
come from errors inserted during the transformation from one phase to its successor,
especially during the transition from the speciﬁcation to the design phase.
Usually each phase is treated with a dedicated formalism, which changes from
one phase to another. Most of the tools helping traceability between the diﬀerent
phases are not powerful enough to formally ensure that unexpected behaviours
have not been inserted when developing the next phase. One possible solution
to this problem is to use the same language/frame along the whole software life-
cycle and to choose it according to its formal capabilities to meet the high level
safety/security requirements. There exist indeed powerful tools, like the diﬀerent
environments based on the B system, introduced by J-R Abrial [21] upon set theory,
which are able to treat a large part of software cycle. The FoCaL environment,
based on type theory, was in fact partly inspired by some work and discussions with
B designers and developers. Yet B and FoCaL have strong diﬀerences (see [23] for
some comparison). Building upon our common knowledge about B and type theory,
and upon the strong ﬁrst author experience of assessing software produced in a B
environment, we explain in this paper how to handle, within FoCaL, most of the
requirements mandated by standards upon the assessment of a software development
life-cycle. Beneﬁts of using a unique formal language are two fold: ﬁrst, ease of
traceability since the expression of the semantics of each phase does not need to be
re-iterated. Second, veriﬁcation between phases may be performed by mechanised
proofs. But diﬃculties do not totally disappear. The main risk is to mix and overlap
phases and therefore to have fuzzy boundaries between phases. We recall that only
software developed following a well formed life-cycle can be easily assessed by a
third-party.
The assessment of life-cycle depends also upon the produced documentation dur-
ing each phase of life-cycle. These artefacts are also subject to strong requirements
by standards concerning content, traceability and maintenance. The FoCaL tool
provides some features to automate the generation of the software documentation
(see section 3).
We illustrate our approach with the development of a voter, a suﬃciently tiny
example to comply with paper size limitations. However, safety device as such
voters are used in safety critical systems as guard against transient faults.
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Several industrial projects rest upon formal methods to build safety critical
systems/software. Usually, the development life-cycle as well as the related require-
ments are treated according to the speciﬁc features of the used formal method.
Then, arguments are provided to convince independent assessors of the compliance
of the ﬁnal product. Our approach departs from those ones as the development of
FoCaL itself and the proposed methodology deeply embed these requirements. We
reap the beneﬁt of this approach with a better view on the relations between critical
development cycle and FoCaL features.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. We present the textual speciﬁcation
of the voter in section 2. We sketch the main characteristics of FoCaL in section 3.
Section 4 presents assessment needs for a safety critical development and their
instantiation in the FoCaL tool, written like a Software Quality Plan would be. We
detail the modelisation of the voter in section 5. We ﬁnally conclude and present
further works in section 6.
2 Overview of the voter
Sensors may exhibit various kinds of errors like bias oﬀset, scale factor, or tran-
sient faults due to sensitivity to spurious or environmental factors (temperature,
pressure,. . . ), that is, transient faults. Redundancy is one of the major techniques
used to guard safety critical systems against such transient faults. There exist
many kinds of redundancies, depending on which characteristics (safety, reliability
or both) should be privileged for the system. Roughly speaking, each redundant
component performs the same work and, when one fails, the others detect it and go
on providing the service.
Usually, a voter is used to elaborate the output from the input values given by the
redundant components. Voters are used, for example, for temperature acquisition
by multiple sensors in a boiler, or elaboration of the emergency brake signal of a
train from several computer replicas. . . The basic principle of a voter is to compare
its input values according to a given consistency relation, and then to output one
value depending on predeﬁned rule. There are two parts in a voter:
• its consistency law, describing the comparison policy between input values (strict
equality, equality within a certain tolerance. . . ).
• its algorithm, describing the choice rules for the output values (majority vote,
identiﬁcation of the faulty input, most restrictive vote, most recent value. . . )
The point is that, in redundant systems, the voter is the component that must be
perfect (as far as possible obviously). A failure of the voter is considered as a major
weakness of the system.
The redundancy called “2 out of 3” (aka 2oo3) participates in obtaining a safe
and reliable system based on 3 identical (or functionally identical) components
connected to a majority voter. From voter results, the system can determine the
actions to take (ﬁltering failure, sending alarms, or system shutdown) in order to
remain within safety conditions.
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The 2oo3 voter, used for our example, selects one value from three independent
inputs if at least two of them are consistent. Moreover, we also want to detect the
faulty value. So, a second output is added to the voter in order to qualify the ﬁrst
result as follows:
• perfect match: the three inputs are consistent, the index of one of them is
returned (ﬁrst one for example).
• partial match: two of the three inputs are consistent together, but the third
one is not. The index of the inconsistent one is returned. This enables identifying
a failure on this input.
• range match: One input is consistent with the two others which are mutually
inconsistent. The index of the consistent value is returned. This can arise when
the consistency law is not transitive (ie. equality within a tolerance). In this case,
the system can go on working with the most plausible value.
• no match: all the inputs are inconsistent two per two. The voter cannot take a
decision since the majority rule is not applicable.
The speciﬁcation of the no match case seems, at ﬁrst sight, satisfactory: no
value is output as there is no good candidate. At the speciﬁcation level, this be-
haviour is acceptable, but a choice has to be made during the design phase; the
component connected to the voter is waiting for two values (the index of the com-
ponent and the ﬂag). It will be its own concern to decide what to do with the ﬁrst
output, according to the second.
3 The FoCaL environment
The FoCaL project was launched in 1998 by T. Hardin and R. Rioboo [7] with the
objective of helping all stages of development of critical software within safety and
security framework, at least when formal methods are required or chosen. The idea
was to elaborate a development environment able to provide high-level and justiﬁed
conﬁdence to users. On the other hand, this system had to remain easy to use by
well-trained engineers.
Currently, FoCaL can be seen as still a prototype of an Integrated Develop-
ment Environment (IDE), for a language providing high level mechanisms such as
inheritance, late binding, redeﬁnition, parametrisation, etc. Conﬁdence in proofs
submitted by developers relies on formal proof veriﬁcation. This support language
was formally described and studied [6,5,22].
A FoCaL development is organised as a hierarchy that may have several roots.
The upper levels of the hierarchy are built along the speciﬁcation stage while the
lower ones correspond to implementation. Each node of the hierarchy corresponds to
a progress toward a complete implementation. We call here reﬁnement the process
of building a top-down hierarchy. The FoCaL reﬁnement process has been formally
studied in [6]. Its formal comparison with other notions of reﬁnement such as those
of B or TLA remains to be done.
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Species
A node of the hierarchy is called a species. A species is a kind of record composed
of ﬁelds, called methods, which may be:
• The method introduced by the keyword rep, exposing the data representation
of values of the species. This type is called the carrier type. Available types
are roughly: type variables, ML-like types (with restricted polymorphism) and
species carrier types (i.e. the carrier of a species can depend on the carrier of
other species). This method is mandatory and can be explicitly given or obtained
by inheritance. It may be undeﬁned (i.e. be just a type variable) along some
inheritance stages but will have to be deﬁned once and only once in the ﬁnal
inheritance branch (ie. collection).
• Declarations, introduced by the keyword signature followed by a name and a
type (no computational body provided).
• Deﬁnitions introduced by the keyword let made of a name, a type and an ex-
pression. Mutually recursive deﬁnitions are introduced by let rec. The syntax
of expressions is very close to those of usual ML family languages.
• Statements, introduced by the keyword property followed by a name and a ﬁrst-
order formula built with the usual connectors (not, and, ∀ . . . ).
• Theorems, introduced by the keyword theorem followed by a name, a statement
and a proof ultimately checked by the Coq proof assistant [14] (see below).
Statements, deﬁnitions and proofs can freely use names of other methods of
the species (denoted by Self!m or shorter !m, or even shorter m if no local function
named m is in the scope). The FoCaL compiler (see below) performs various analyses
to ensure that dependencies between properties, deﬁnitions and proofs do not lead
to cycles or logical inconsistencies.
A let rec deﬁnition is not considered as leading to a dependence cycle. Here
is a strong diﬀerence with most usual object-oriented languages where methods are
considered as mutually recursive without any restriction. Hence, the FoCaL “object”
model is diﬀerent since species are not classes, nor objects according to the usual
meanings in the object oriented terminology. Species are not ﬁrst class-values, only
values living in carriers are so. Method types are type expressions a` la ML. The
expression Self in a type denotes the rep of the species and should be understood
as Self!rep.
The elements of the species are called entities, to emphasise the fact that they
are deﬁned not only by their representation, but also by the functions manipulating
them and their properties.
Inheritance
We say that a species A2 “reﬁnes” a species A1 if A2 inherits from A1 and “adds
precision” to A1. That is, the methods introduced in A1 and/or the carrier type
of A1 are made more concrete (more deﬁned) in A2 (it is not the B reﬁnement
concept). In case A2 multiply inherits from two species Si having a method with
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the same name, then the types of the two methods must be compatible (they must
have a most general uniﬁer [10]). If both methods are deﬁned, the last inherited
deﬁnition is kept (as in OCaml[9]) in A2.
In addition, new methods can be added in A2 and already given deﬁnitions
can be redeﬁned. However, once fully deﬁned by a concrete type, rep cannot be
redeﬁned, for logical consistency reasons.
Interfaces
The type of a species is obtained by erasing deﬁnitions and proofs. If the carrier
(Self!rep) is not deﬁned, it will silently be considered as a type variable (e.g.
α) and the species type will also be silently preﬁxed by an existential binder ∃α.
This binder will be eliminated as soon as the rep gets instantiated (deﬁned) and
must be eliminated to obtain runnable code. The interface of a species is obtained
by abstracting the rep type in all the method types of the species type and this
abstraction is permanent (see the paragraph Collections).
While species types remain totally implicit to users, interfaces are simply denoted
by the species name. Interfaces can be ordered by inclusion, a point providing a
very simple notion of sub-typing.
Collections
A species is said to be complete if all declarations have received deﬁnitions and
all properties have received proofs. When complete, a species can be submitted to
an abstraction process of its carrier to create a collection. Thus the interface of
the collection is built out of the type of its underlying species. A collection can
hence be seen as an abstract data type, only usable through the methods of its
interface, but having the guarantee that all methods/theorems are deﬁned/proved
and that invariants used to build the underlying species cannot be broken by using
this “component on the shelf”.
Parametrised species
Species can be parametrised by collections. The formal parameter is introduced
by a name C and an interface I. Any collection CC having an interface including
I can be used as actual parameter for C.Methods and statements ﬁguring in I are
denoted by C!m in the species body (C!rep allows to use the rep of C as an abstract
type). As any CC is issued from a complete species no “link error” can arise at
run-time and properties of CC can be used as lemmas.
FoCaL allows very simple dependent types via parametrisation: a collection pa-
rameter being already introduced, an entity parameter denoting a value of the col-
lection parameter carrier can be introduced. The syntax forbids dependence cycles
between parameters and the compiler ensures consistency between the parameters.
Late-binding and redeﬁnitions
As previously mentioned, methods may be only declared. This means that the
operation is only equipped with a signature (signature) and properties (property)
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but no eﬀective implementation. However deﬁnitions of other methods may refer
to such only declared methods. This is indeed perfectly safe as runnable code can
be obtained only from collections. Thus these only declared methods will need
to be deﬁned later in the inheritance hierarchy in order to allow construction of
collections. Now, late-binding brings the supplementary possibility to link together
methods according to their latest deﬁnition. This way, it is possible to rely at any
stage, while deﬁning or proving properties of a method m, on a not yet implemented
method p, which functional model is enough to work on m. Once a computational
body is provided to p, the resolution mechanism will automatically link p and m’s
bodies. This mechanism also enables to redeﬁne a method at any inheritance level,
always keeping the latest deﬁned one in the ﬁnal collection extracted from the
species.
On the proof side, if a proof π of m uses only the type of p, π remains valid
when p is deﬁned or redeﬁned. If the deﬁnition of p is needed to achieve the proof
π, clearly, π is no more valid after redeﬁnition of p. The compiler invalidates all
proofs depending on an “old” deﬁnition and prompts the user to redo the proofs.
Thus, redeﬁnition is fully safe.
Proof and automation
As properties must be proved, at latest before the collection level, a strong
eﬀort is done to have automated tools collaborating with FoCaL in order to get
these proofs automatically done by theorems provers. FoCaL is designed to be open
to whatever kind of such provers: it currently supports Zenon [17] which is an
automated theorem prover developed by D. Doligez [18]. When Zenon succeeds,
it produces a Coq proof term. Moreover, some experiments have been done with
the rewriting based prover CiMe [15,16]. These external provers are dedicated to
some speciﬁc kinds of proofs and may discharge the developer from making proofs
by hand.
Compilation
Compilation of FoCaL sources leads, today, to both OCaml [9] and Coq codes.
The generated OCaml code provides the executable form of the development. On
the other side, the Coq code is produced from both the species source code, the
proof terms of Zenon and the Coq proofs directly given by the user. Indeed, getting
proofs is a quite satisfactory thing, but one must ensure these proofs are indeed
correct. Obviously, no human being would stand reading pages of demonstrations
to get convinced of this correctness! The Coq code will be checked by the Coq
theorem prover who will act as assessor, not only on all the proofs contained in the
development but also on the whole consistency of the model.
On the executable side, work is currently performed in the FoCaLteam to gen-
erate C code. Generation towards most of programming languages is possible since
required features are mainly record data structures.
FoCaL semantics was initially speciﬁed in Coq, which brings a satisfactory conﬁ-
dence in the language’s correctness. On the other side, the correction of the compiler
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against FoCaL’s semantics was proved in [5].
Documentation
Safety developments must contain various documentation items to be assessed.
Creation of this documentation can be assisted by FoCaL by extraction of com-
ments that can (and should) be embedded within the development (code) and from
the code itself. As previously stated, these comments may describe non-functional
requirements and will be available for traceability purpose. These comments are
kept during the compilation process, linked to FoCaL entities forming the software,
and can be automatically processed by (internal or external) tools processing the
abstract syntax tree of the program. FoCaL’s architecture allows to easily interface
analyses/tools with the internals of the compiler to take advantage of the analy-
ses it already performs. In combination with the properties and operations of the
species (i.e. theorems and functions), it is possible to automatically generate (in
the simplest case) a document (HTML for instance) describing the system. More-
over, UML diagrams can be automatically extracted from a Focal Model [20]. This
permits to the developer to have a graphical view of its model and also facilitate
the communication between the developer, the client and the assessor.
4 Software life-cycle within FoCaL
As said in the introduction, the life-cycle of critical software is based on a 5 steps
V-cycle similar to the V-cycle of classical software development cycle. The main
diﬀerence is that it is submitted to a traceability analysis by an independent veriﬁca-
tion team after each phase while another independent validation team performs the
software testing. This implies that the boundary between each life-cycle phase must
be clearly identiﬁed when a unique formalism is used along the whole development.
As presented in section 3, a FoCaL model is made of species which are used to
describe all the phases of the cycle. Properties can be expressed as ﬁrst-order formu-
lae, a choice which is recognised as a good compromise between the expressiveness
of the logic framework and its ease of use. Indeed FoCaL is intended to be used not
only by computer researchers or mathematicians, but also by smart engineers with
minimal background in logic.
Currently FoCaL provides no syntactical categories to distinguish between the
diﬀerent stages of a life-cycle and we are not sure that such distinctions will be
beneﬁcial for engineers as they could perhaps add too much rigour. Instead, we
propose to provide species templates dedicated for each phase of the development
life-cycle. Since each phase addresses a diﬀerent view of the system, these templates
will be deﬁned by the kind and the forms of methods (declarations, deﬁnitions,
properties, proofs) which should be used (or not) during the considered phase.
They will help to identify clear boundaries between phases, which is mandatory for
the veriﬁcation process.
The following ﬁgure depicts the classical V life-cycle for software development.
In this paper, we consider only requirements speciﬁcation, architecture design,
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Fig. 1. The classical V life-cycle
coding and maintenance phases. The phase “Integration/validation testing” is con-
sidered in the work of C. Dubois and M. Carlier [12].
4.1 Speciﬁcation phase
The aim is to specify the interface and the requirements for the software based on
the Statement Of Work (SOW) delivered by the customer. In fact, the requirement
phase is a way to re-express the customer needs with a software engineering view.
Requirements are usually split into two parts:
• Functional requirements focus on describing the expected behaviour of the sys-
tem/software without referring to any speciﬁc solution. These requirements de-
scribe the relations between inputs and outputs of the software.
• Non-functional requirements describe all constraints of the software, like time
and space bounds, safety integrity levels to achieve, portability needs. . . These
requirements are pretty diﬃcult to express in term of software design models but
are mandatory to issue an industrial system.
• For critical software, there is a third kind of requirements called Safety require-
ments. Safety requirements are coming from the results of the safety studies
performed on the previous phases. They ensure that the functional requirements
will never trigger a Feared Event. They can be considered as requirements on the
two ﬁrst kinds of requirements.
A species describing a component of a speciﬁcation will follow the species for
speciﬁcation template. It is a species containing only speciﬁcation requirements
expressed as follows:
• A functional requirement is represented by a signature (name and type) and
functional properties (described below).
• A safety requirement is also represented by properties on these signatures. How-
ever, their shape is slightly diﬀerent from the functional properties since they do
not express property on the function behaviour, but rather characteristics of the
function.
• Non functional requirements which cannot be – easily – expressed by a ﬁrst-order
formula are put inside commentaries and, as they are kept along the compilation
process, they can receive separate treatments (see section 3). This is a way to
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ensure their traceability through the development.
• Proofs that the safety requirements are respected by the functional requirements,
under the hypothesis that the functional properties hold.
• In addition, since a component can be parametrised by other ones, one must
express the mandatory properties these other components must comply with.
We call them ”glue” assumptions.
Functional and safety requirements are both encoded as FoCaL properties. We
distinguish between them by introducing a template for the functional ones as fol-
lows.
Since a functional property expresses the relation between inputs and outputs
of the component, we propose the following template:
signature foo in t_1 -> t_2 -> ... -> t_n -> Self ;
(* Requirement 1 for foo. *)
property foo_1:
all i_1 in t_1 , i_2 in t_2 ,... i_n in t_n ,
(* Pre -condition on the signature. *)
r1 (i_1 , i_2 , ..., i_n )
->
(* Post - condition on the signature. *)
r2 (i_1 , i_2 , ..., i_n , foo (i_1 , i_2 , ..., i_n )) ;
in which r 1 and r 2 are properties on signatures (local or imported by parametri-
sation) and “glue” assumptions.
At this stage of the life-cycle, proofs can be made that safety requirements are
entailed by the functional requirements on functions and by the glue assumptions on
the imported functions. Indeed, late-binding and collection mechanisms in FoCaL
allow to already perform proofs of the safety requirements, without having deﬁni-
tions of functions declared in the species, nor proofs from imported components
already done. The system ensures that such deﬁnitions will be given and proofs
of their properties will be done before the creation of the collections deﬁning the
system. In the same way, the user may be sure that the components passed as
actual parameters later in the life-cycle will have these proofs done, hence he may
safely assume them at this stage.
The phase ending criterion is when all the safety requirements are proved. Usu-
ally no deﬁnition is introduced during the speciﬁcation phase. However, some deﬁni-
tions of mathematical functions can help to express requirements: it is easier to rely
on the deﬁnition of the absolute value function instead of expressing it only through
its characteristic properties. We currently consider the possibility of adding a new
syntactic category (logical let) to handle such deﬁnitions which may be useless in
the following phases (for example, by in-lining of the absolute value function).
4.2 Architecture and design phase
This stage is dedicated to introduce the architectural choices to answer the speciﬁ-
cation requirements. It describes:
• the software breakdown into components,
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• the behaviour of each component,
• the data exchanged between components ,
• the inter-relations between components (inheritance, parametrisation. . . ),
• the scheduling of components.
For critical software, the design should follow design rules. These rules are guide-
lines to apply in order to achieve and ease the safety demonstration and description
of all constraints coming from the hardware supporting the software (built-in-tests
to perform, hardware performance and reliability. . . ) or pre-existing software (Op-
erating System, COTS. . . ).
According to the presentation of this phase, we propose to give the following
structure for a species for design:
• Breakdown of the software must answer 2 main issues: to propose eﬃcient al-
gorithms and to respect the functional requirements expressed in the previous
phase. FoCaL’s parametrisation allows acquisition of existing or future (i.e. not
yet implemented) dedicated species oﬀering such algorithms and inheritance can
be used to keep traceability between the two phases.
• Deﬁnition of the behaviour via a progressive carrier choice and via the imple-
mentation of the signatures (possibly working on the carrier’s structure). FoCaL
authorises re-deﬁnition of methods previously implemented. This feature may be
handy to specialise algorithms for a speciﬁc data representation of the carrier.
• Proofs of the functional requirements ensure that, through the breakdown steps
and the introduction of deﬁnitions, the functional properties given in the species
for speciﬁcation are indeed fully implemented. This achieves the traceability
between phases.
The reﬁnement process between speciﬁcation and design may span on several in-
heritance steps. Late-binding enables the use of a method not yet deﬁned, and to be
sure that once deﬁned, the compiler will ﬁnd and use it. These points are especially
crucial to perform successive and incremental reﬁnements. Hence, it is possible to
incrementally implement some concepts, enunciate properties, make proofs, and all
of them will be kept (inherited) from the parent(s), providing that the compiler
didn’t detect redeﬁnitions breaking parent deﬁnitions. This last point ensures that
at any inherited stage properties and implementations remain consistent even in
case of redeﬁnition. Moreover, following an incremental reﬁnement, it is possible to
derive by inheritance several species from a same parent. The parent may provide
a default implementation of a method and each child will be free to redeﬁne or not
this implementation according to its own constraints.
Obviously, industrial projects rarely start from a blank page. It is usual to
reuse external components (middleware, operating system primitives, COTS. . . ).
For this reason, FoCaL provides a way to make these external components available
in the model. However, a safe development cannot on one hand simply assume
that such components are safe, and on the other hand cannot prove their properties
as these COSTS are usually black boxes. Our solution, in term of methodology,
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is to verify by testing that these properties hold and then to assert the functional
properties required on these components by issuing a proof reduced to the keyword
admitted. This solution is certainly unsatisfactory for purists, but this is the only
possible choice when using external COTS. The compiler inserts the fact that these
properties have been admitted in the documentation. So the reader is warned about
that and may review the test results [12].
Like any development environment, FoCaL provides a set of fully proved “stan-
dard” libraries on which developments can safely rely. It is worth mentioning that
there is a library for symbolic computation on multivariate polynomials, on all
ordered-based mathematical structures and a generic one on access control by which
most of the usual access control policies received a FoCaL implementation.
The software breakdown is iterated until obtaining the proof of all the software
items. A software item is deﬁned as the smallest piece of software that can be
compiled and tested alone. The phase ending criterion is when the proofs of the
functional requirements are done based on the deﬁnition of the software components,
on the properties of the reuse external components and on the ”glue” assumptions.
4.3 Implementation phase
This stage aims to produce the source code that implements the components. For
critical software, speciﬁc coding rules should be followed. These rules describe the
safe subset of the language that may be used. Low-level testing is also performed
during this stage. It permits veriﬁcation that each software item is in line with its
documentation and does not contain systematic bugs (table overﬂow, division by
zero,. . . ). At this stage, the software items are “clear”, i.e. seen as white boxes.
We propose to give the following structure to a species for implementation:
• Final assembly of species. The aim is to produce a complete species, in which
all the methods are implemented or externally linked (i.e. there are no more
signatures without their related implementation).
• The proofs induced by the ﬁnal assembly. They enable the user to ensure that
the “glue” assumptions set out during the speciﬁcation phase hold.
Once such a complete species is obtained, it is possible to turn it into a collection,
which corresponds to an eﬀective piece of software able to compute and give back
results.
From this collection the FoCaL compiler generates target code of the software
build. The phase ending criterion is obviously when the executable is produced.
Although FoCaL relies upon object-oriented ﬂavours for speciﬁcation and design, it
produces no object-oriented target code. This is very important because the pro-
duced code fulﬁls the safe language subset recommended by standards and is easily
traceable to the model by independent assessors. Finally this permits FoCaL back-
ends to most languages since it only relies on common and widespread programming
language features (mostly modules and records).
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4.4 Maintenance phase
This stage is dedicated to keep the consistency of the model despite any required or
imposed evolutions (hardware obsolescence or changes, enhancement requests, new
regulations from authorities or even bug ﬁxes). The mainly used mechanisms are
redeﬁnition, inheritance and late-binding just at the needed level in the hierarchy
deﬁning the system. Standards require that each modiﬁcation must be traced and
its impact on the whole system has to be clearly identiﬁed. Because FoCaL provides
highly eﬃcient dependencies calculus [5], proofs to be redone are automatically
exhibited and strictly limited to the performed modiﬁcations. Since software is
formally developed using a well established life-cycle, impacts of modiﬁcations are
under control.
4.5 Transverse processes
Transverse processes are tasks performed on every life-cycle phase. For a FoCaL
development, there are two transverse processes:
• proofs to be performed at each phase. These proofs have 2 aims: correctness of
the provided deﬁnition and correctness of the reﬁnement between phases. The
last point ensures the formal traceability between phases.
• the generation of the documentation associated to each phase.
Proof of a FoCaL model is assisted by theorem prover (see paragraph ’proof’ on
section 3). Of course, some proofs cannot be fully automated and remain in charge
of the engineer. However, the experience proves that automated tools strongly help
in eﬀective FoCaL developments. FoCaL’s standard library (more that 7500 lines of
formal mathematics in FoCaL) is mostly proved thanks to Zenon!
FoCaL is strongly connected to the Coq proof assistant [14] since it acts as its
ﬁnal assessor. Coq is a well established system already used in the industrial and
academic domains [13], which allows to put enough conﬁdence in its veriﬁcations.
The use of a formal demonstration checker acting as an assessor of the proofs avoids
having to perform these veriﬁcations by hand and especially prevents errors during
these veriﬁcations. The choice of using Coq obviously implies that any automated
prover collaborating with FoCaL must be able to provide as output a Coq proof
trace.
Beneﬁts of a unique language come from the ease of traceability since there is a
unique semantics for each phase. Figure 2 summarises FoCaL’s main features used
during the life-cycle phases.
Documentation of the development is not missed: during each phase, documen-
tation can be extracted from the FoCaL model (see paragraph ’documentation’ on
section 3). All these documentations are valuable for the assessor to verify the
safety issues and for the testing team in order to produce the validation tests. Note
that even if the software is formally developed, an independent validation testing
is mandatory. Finally, this documentation can be included in the artifacts for the
system safety-case.
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Fig. 2. FoCaL features along the life-cycle
5 Voter implementation
We now present an implementation of a voter in FoCaL following the development
life-cycle.
Voter speciﬁcation phase
Species Sp voter presents the signature of the vote function, the functional re-
quirements of vote and the constraints that imported components must respect for
the voter to be proved. Here we force the imported comparison function comp value
representing the consistency law to be symmetric. This avoids the need to consider
all comparisons combinations.
(* Specification species for the vote algorithm part. *)
species Sp_voter (Q is Sp_qualifier , Si is Sp_sensor_index , V is Value)
inherits Basic_object =
(* Declaration of the vote function:
it takes 3 values and returns a sensor (index * qualifier). *)
signature vote : V -> V -> V -> (Si * Q) ;
signature sensor in (Si * Q) -> Si ; (* Get the first component of the
voter. *)
signature state in (Si * Q) -> Q ; (* Get the second component of the voter
. *)
(* Functional requirement 1: vote between 3 compatible values . *)
property vote_perfect :
all v1 v2 v3 in V,
((V!comp_value (v1 , v2) /\ V! comp_value (v2, v3) /\ V!comp_value (v1 , v3)
) ->
(Si!equal (sensor (vote (v1 , v2, v3)), Si!capt_1 ) /\
Q!equal (state (vote (v1, v2 , v3)), Q!perfect_match))) ;
...
(* Constraint on imported functions: function comp_value must be symmetric.
*)
property comp_value_is_symmetric :
all v1 v2 in V, V!comp_value (v1 , v2) -> V!comp_value (v2, v1) ;
...
Voter design phase
In this phase, we give an eﬀective implementation to the vote function and we
prove that it satisﬁes the functional requirements (c.f. vote perfect).
(* Design phase of the voter algorithm. *)
species Imp_voter (Q is Sp_qualifier , Q is Sp_qualifier , Si is
Sp_sensor_index ,
V is Value)
inherits Sp_voter (Si, Q, V) =
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rep = unit ; (* Definition of the carrier. *)
(* Definition of the function. *)
let vote (v1 in V, v2 in V, v3 in V) in (Si * Q) =
let c1 = V!comp_value (v1, v2) in
let c2 = V!comp_value (v1, v3) in
let c3 = V!comp_value (v2, v3) in
if c1 then
if c2 then
if c3 then (Si!capt_1 , Q! perfect_match)
else ...
(* Proof of the functional requirements. *)
proof of vote_perfect =
by property Si!comp_transitive , Q!comp_transitive definition of vote
...
Voter implementation phase
The concrete species is built by providing eﬀective collections to each voter’s pa-
rameters. At this stage, “glue” assumptions are proved (c.f. comp value is symmetric).
(* Definition of the closed species. *)
species Concrete_coll_int_imp_vote_tol inherits
Imp_vote (Coll_etat_vote , Coll_capteur , Coll_int_imp_value_tol ) =
(* Proof of the properties of the imported function. *)
proof of comp_value_is_symmetric =
by Coll_int_imp_value_tol !comp_value_symmetric ;
...
end ;;
(* Final point: get the frozen and run -able component. *)
collection Coll_int_imp_vote_tol implements Concrete_coll_int_imp_vote ;;
6 Conclusion and further works
FoCaL is a living demonstration that an academic development framework can be
created, integrating simultaneously strong expressiveness and semantics, eﬃcient
target code and industrial needs to assess the produced software. Indeed, the FoCaL
tool provides a usable compromise between the ease to develop and the constraints
imposed by standards.
Several examples have been developed following the present methodology like
hierarchical automata’s, physical input acquisition,. . .
Ten years after its birth, the language is now mature enough to add enhance-
ments, and to bring stability and openings to external tools. A complete rewriting
of the tool is currently performed to improve compilation and to facilitate inte-
gration of new features. Some other system paradigms (like synchronous features,
higher-order parametrisation, certiﬁed C back-end. . . ) are currently studied, always
keeping in mind that the produced software must be assessed by an independent
authority before its commissioning.
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